China has traditionally been a land power and, despite its rhetoric of owning the South China Sea “since ancient times”. It has only recently started projecting power in maritime areas beyond its coastline. Indeed, the first People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) circumnavigation of the globe only occurred in 2002.
However, China’s modern-day naval modernization and growth has been nothing less than meteoric. Not only in the South China Sea, but in the Arctic, around Taiwan and elsewhere, China is asserting maritime rights or attempting to secure influence.
As an example, a Type 052DL destroyer and Type 055 cruiser have recently arrived in Port Vila of the island nation of Vanuatu for a naval diplomacy visit.
Dr. Andrew Erickson, Professor of Strategy at the US Naval War College, in a study called ‘Geography Matters, Time Collides: Mapping China’s Maritime Strategic Space under Xi’, described China’s mental conception of national-security priorities as being concentric. The greatest strength is used to secure China’s immediate periphery, while the next ring outside of that is a zone of disruption against potential attackers, and the third ring can be ventured into largely only at the sufferance of stronger regional powers.
These three areas can be referred to as zones of control, influence, and reach respectively.
Xi Jinping’s blue-ribbon Belt and Road Initiative achieved a smooth expansion of Chinese influence over land, specifically through Central Asia and onward to Europe and the Middle East. Erickson, however, made the observation, “Regarding the projection of sea power, China faces difficult opponents and geography. It is nevertheless becoming an increasingly formidable opponent to neighbours over sovereignty disputes, none more so than Taiwan.”
After communism secured China’s heartland, it then gained control over ethnoreligious minority borderlands such as Tibet and fought border wars with India (1962), Russia (1969) and Vietnam (1979). As for its seaboard, the PLA only captured Hainan in 1950, and it failed to wrest control of Kuomintang fortresses on the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu. In fact, a Taiwan contingency is the PLA’s most pressing concern and, some might say, desire.
Erickson commented in his report published by the National Bureau of Asia Research, “History and geography still matter today. Although China has now settled its land border disputes with all neighbours save India and Bhutan, its achievements in the maritime domain are mixed. Leaders under Xi Jinping regard extensive outstanding claims in the “near seas” – the Yellow, East China and South China Seas – as historical injustices that must ultimately be rectified, thereby demonstrating the Chinese Communist Party’s unique ability to reclaim China’s rightful place.”
Notably, China today has the world’s most numerous and extensive disputed island/feature claims, and the largest number of counterparties. China’s main strategic direction is towards the southeast maritime area, and it has the world’s largest sea forces in terms of navy, coast guard, and maritime militia.
Erickson further assessed, “This seaward surge reflects the confluence of strategic fundaments, the enduring shaping power of geography and geo-historical implications. Powered by the world’s second-largest economy and defence budget, China has gone to sea with scale, sophistication, and sea power components that no continental country previously sustained in modernity. They are supplied by the world’s largest shipyard infrastructure, yielding the fastest expansion of production capacity and largest military build-up since World War II.”
Xi is China’s first navalist leader. He added a “far seas protection” strategy in 2015, and since 2019 the PLAN has pursued an emerging blend of near-seas defence, far-seas protection, global oceanic presence and expansion to the two poles. Erickson also explained: “Already China and its military have achieved a status and confidence unseen in nearly two centuries and unprecedented in sophistication and geographic scope – going, literally and figuratively, where elements of the Chinese state power never went before.
This enables the production and projection of military power in unprecedented ways. The extent to which China can deliver force sustainably over increasing distances to further its burgeoning interests is one of the key questions of 21st-century geopolitics – with major consequences for Beijing’s role and footprint in the world and for US and allied interests.”
Just as ancient China built the Great Wall to protect against aggressors arriving by land, so China has built a coastal defensive belt, particularly through reclaiming islands in the South China Sea and turning them into military bastions. These aid the PLAN’s expansion into both the Pacific and Indian Oceans, as will new naval bases in Cambodia and Djibouti.
As part of its coercion against Taiwan, China conducted one-day Joint Sword-2024B military sea and air drills all around Taiwan on 14 October. Under cover of military exercises, this is how China might one day implement a “quarantine” led by law enforcement agencies, or even more aggressively, a naval blockade, against Taiwan.
Discussing possible Chinese blockade scenarios against Taiwan, a study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the USA noted: “Given its current military capabilities, some in Beijing may assess that a blockade carries a higher chance of operational success than an invasion in the near term. Yet Chinese decision-makers likely recognize that a blockade would be an immensely risky choice with no guarantee of success.”
Taiwan is reliant on international trade, importing some 97% of its energy and 70% of its food. The CSIS authors noted, “China does not need to hermetically seal off Taiwan to achieve its goals. Curtailing trade into Taiwan by even 50% would prove detrimental for Taiwan, especially if Beijing stops all or most imports of oil, natural gas and coal, which would eventually cause progressive failures in electric power distribution around the island.”
Nevertheless, such actions are fraught with risk. “A blockade would not be without its drawbacks for Beijing. There is no guarantee that a blockade alone will achieve Beijing’s goals. If Taiwan proves resilient, and if it receives assistance from the United States or others, China may find it impossible to force Taiwan’s capitulation without forcefully occupying the island.” The report said a Taiwan blockade would be a “serious gamble and would not guarantee China more success than an invasion”.
Any blockade would rely heavily on naval surface and submarine fleets; air forces; conventional rocket forces; coastal and air defence forces; and support forces. The CSIS study posited three potential scenarios: an all-out kinetic blockade (perhaps using missiles initially), a mining blockade (e.g. submarines laying mines outside Taiwanese ports) and a limited blockade.
Taiwan represents a core interest for China, and Erickson warned: “Along virtually any strategic trajectory that China might follow, cross-strait security seems far from guaranteed. This much is clear: at a time when China under Xi Jinping is unprecedentedly powerful in the maritime domain, Taiwan is increasingly targeted and vulnerable.”
Erickson proffered a tentative Chinese prioritization of other maritime spheres too: (1) near seas and First Island Chain; (2) waters out to the Second Island Chain; (3) the Western Pacific out to a Third Island Chain bisecting Hawaii and the northern Indian Ocean; (4) the Atlantic Ocean, Mediterranean Sea and Arctic Ocean; and (5) beyond.
China faces a severe power-distance gradient, where it loses strength the farther it travels away from home. It does not have the allies, overseas bases and as many power projection platforms like aircraft carriers that the USA has, for example. Furthermore, maritime chokepoints and barriers – many occupied by the USA or close allies like Japan and the Philippines – also hinder China’s ability to project naval power far beyond its coastline. The sea routes available to China to travel into the Indian Ocean are very limited – such as the Malacca or Sunda Straits – and these can easily be blockaded by an enemy.
As already mentioned, Xi has beefed up its claims, presence and aggression in the South China Sea. For instance, China is currently and dramatically improving military capabilities on Triton Island in the Paracel Islands, 320km south of Hainan Island.
Chatham House analysts, using satellite imagery analysis, believe Triton is “set to become one of Beijing’s key signal intelligence bases in the South China Sea”.
Analysts commented: “The most striking development is the construction of a new radar system, known as SIAR – synthetic impulse and aperture radar – which purportedly detects stealth aircraft. The counter-stealth radar on Triton is characterized by its distinctive octagonal structure, which resembles another SIAR system built by China on Subi Reef in the Spratly Islands, south of the Paracels, in 2017. A half-completed tower also sits near the SIAR radar on Triton, which is likely to be the operations center.”
The radar will be part of a wider network of at least three overlapping counter-stealth radars across the South China Sea and Hainan Island. Chatham House also identified a large launch pad on Triton, likely for anti-ship missiles. Today, China is ranging much farther and more regularly away from its coastline and South China Sea. The northern hemisphere summer of 2024 saw more Chinese activity in the Arctic and near-Arctic regions than ever before, for instance. A recently published US Naval War College report by Professor Ryan Martinson, entitled China’s Summer of 2024: The Missing Chapter, discussed China’s growing interest in the Arctic.
Befitting its naval ambitions, China possesses the world’s largest fleet of oceanographic ships. All data they collect is inherently dual use – suitable for both scientific and military purposes. Both scientific and naval hydrographic ships collect and share data with the PLA so the military can improve its awareness of and ability to predict the maritime operating environment.
China’s first Arctic expedition occurred in 1999, but Martinson observed “a major expansion” in hydrographic activities in the northern polar region in the summer of 2024. Three icebreaking research ships conducted Arctic cruises (Snow Dragon 2, Jidi and Zhong Shan Da Xue Jidi) whilst two other 5,000-ton oceangoing survey ships conducted detailed surveys (Xiang Yang Hong 01 and Kexue).
Notably, Xiang Yang Hong 01 operated in Russia’s EEZ for several days – “a very rare, maybe unprecedented, event, that could not have happened without Russian permission. Perhaps more noteworthy, Russia allowed the ship to access Avacha Bay, home of key elements of Russia’s Pacific Fleet, including its submarine units. This too has likely never happened before. These two events provide a valuable index of the current state of China-Russia maritime cooperation,” Martinson pointed out.
The two hydrographic vessels actively surveyed in the Bering Strait between Russia and Alaska, a waterway of critical importance since it connects China with the Arctic Ocean; it is China’s main access route to the northern polar region. Martinson said of the Bering Strait, “It could be used by Chinese merchant ships, coast guard cutters, surface combatants and submarines, both in war and peace. Thus, it is vital that China develop a detailed knowledge of its seabed and water column.”
Significantly, both the Xiang Yang Hong 01 and Kexue conducted marine scientific research in waters above the US-claimed extended continental shelf.
This is because, in December 2023, the USA formally described the outer limits of an extended continental shelf beyond its EEZ, including in the Bering Sea. This move brought much of the seabed in the central Bering Sea under US jurisdiction, meaning it has exclusive rights to explore and exploit any resources there. Yet on their recent voyages, the pair of Chinese vessels completed surveys in areas where the USA now asserts jurisdiction over marine scientific research.
Because the USA has not ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), China rejects this American continental shelf claim and calls it “illegal, null and void”. Ironically, China – who is a signatory to UNCLOS – also calls the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s damning indictment of its own territorial claims in the South China Sea as null and void. In other words, Beijing uses UNCLOS when it suits, and dumps it when it gets in the way.
As tensions between China and others grow in various maritime areas as Beijing exerts itself more forcefully, Martinson thus concluded, “Depending on what these surveys entailed, their actions may have represented a direct PRC challenge to a US maritime claim – perhaps for the first time in the history of US-China relations.” As China stretches its newfound sea legs, Beijing is unfortunately setting the scene for potential confrontations in various hotspots.
